Germany is Not Volkswagen
OCT 7, 2015
MUNICH
– The Volkswagen scandal has raised questions about the German model of
production. If the success of the company’s diesel-powered vehicles was
due in part to fraudulent efforts to conceal the amount of harmful
pollutants they emitted, will similar revelations at other companies
call into questions the country’s transformation from “the sick man of
Europe” to an export-driven economic powerhouse?
Fortunately, the
answer is almost certainly no. Germany’s competitive advantage has less
to do with chicanery than with how its firms are structured and the
culture in which they operate. Germany’s leading car company is an
exception to the manufacturing rules that have driven the country’s
success, not an example of them.
Indeed, Germany’s
success is frequently cited as a model that other countries should
emulate, and rightly so. Since the beginning of the century, the country
has grown to become one of the world’s leading exporters, outstripping
all other major European countries. From 2000 to 2013, Germany’s exports
grew by 154%, compared to 127% for Spain, 98% for the United Kingdom,
79% for France, and 72% for Italy.
The leading
explanation for Germany’s impressive recent export performance is wage
restraint. But, as a comparison with Spain reveals, faster wage growth
elsewhere cannot be the entire story. To be sure, from 2000 to 2008,
German wages increased by 19%, compared to 48% in Spain. But after the
2009 financial crisis, the roles were reversed. From 2009 to 2013,
German nominal wages increased by more than 14%, compared to 4% in
Spain. And yet, despite the more rapid rise in German wages, the
country’s exports rebounded faster than Spain’s – or those of any other
European Union country.
The most important
factor behind Germany’s success is that the structure of its firms
improves the quality of their products. German exporters are organized
in a way that is less hierarchical and more decentralized than other
European firms. This gives them several advantages. Decentralization
enables employees at lower levels of the corporate hierarchy to devise
and implement new ideas. As these employees are often closer to
customers than those higher up, their collective knowledge about what
the market is demanding is an important source of value.
Tapping this
knowledge allows Germany to compete on quality, not price. Indeed, if
wage restraint were the main factor in Germany’s success, it would be
hard pressed to outperform French, Italian, British, and Spanish
exporters, who compete mainly on price by offshoring production to
low-wage countries. Instead, the German focus on quality allows its
firms to charge higher prices and gain new customers. When exporters are
asked to rank their products relative to a market average, 40% of
German exporters classify their goods as top quality, while only 10% of
French exporters do so.
Decentralized
management has helped German exporters triple their share of the global
market for top-quality goods compared to those firms that did not
reorganize. Indeed, when I studied the top 1% of German exporters – the
country’s export superstars – I found that they more than doubled their
share of the world export market when they opted to decentralize their
organizations.
This focus on quality
could explain why German exports rebounded quickly after 2009, despite
the rise in nominal wages. Quality makes exporters less vulnerable to
changes in price – including those driven by rising wages. By contrast,
those countries in which firms compete on price may have felt more
pressure to move production abroad as domestic wages rose. Germany’s
relative insensitivity to rising costs could also explain why its
government is comfortable with a strong euro, whereas France and Italy
have been calling on the European Central Bank to weaken the currency.
Volkswagen, it turns
out, took a different approach from that of most other German firms.
Rather than decentralizing power, CEO Martin Winterkorn sat at the head
of a centralized, command-and-control organization in which he acted as a
patriarch. His desire to take the company to the very top of the global
car industry, surpassing Toyota, put enormous strain on his managers to
deliver growth. The result – a decision to cheat on emissions tests –
says less about Germany’s culture of manufacturing than about rot at the
car company, beginning at the very top.
According to the World Value Survey,
Germany is a high-trust society, in which citizens have confidence in
one another’s behavior and act accordingly. Indeed, the lesson of the
Volkswagen scandal is that this culture may be necessary for its export
model to work. French and Italian exporters that introduced
decentralized management did not increase their share of the global
market for top-quality goods. The likely reason is that providing
division managers with greater autonomy not only frees them up to
respond to market demands; it also allows them to put their own career
interests above the wellbeing of the firm.
If Germany is to
maintain its economic dominance, it will have to do something far harder
than keeping wages in check or restructuring hierarchies. It will have
to ensure that the culture of integrity underlying its success remains
unchanged by the pressures of global competition.
Dalia Marin is Chair of International
Economics at the University of Munich and a senior research fellow at
Breugel, the Brussels-based economic think tank.
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